On October 31, 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2797 (2025) on the situation in Western Sahara. The resolution was approved with 11 votes in favor, 3 abstentions (China, Russia, and Pakistan), and no votes against.
Although this resolution renews the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until October 31, 2026, what makes it different is its emphasis on the Moroccan autonomy plan as the core of the region’s future, rather than on the principle of self-determination for the Sahrawi people, which had been central since the UN first became involved in the conflict.
It is noteworthy that less than a month earlier, on October 16, 2025, a resolution adopted by the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly expressed support for the negotiation process launched by Security Council Resolution 1754 (2007) and subsequent resolutions, with the aim of reaching a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.
Among its main provisions, the new Security Council resolution states that an autonomy status for the territory under the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Morocco would be the most viable solution to the dispute. It therefore invites the parties—Morocco and, on the other side, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front)—to resume negotiations amid ongoing armed confrontations.
It also requests the UN Secretary-General to provide a strategic report on the situation and MINURSO’s mandate within six months, while reiterating the need for humanitarian cooperation and respect for human rights.
MINURSO was established by Security Council Resolution 690 of 1991, in accordance with the settlement proposals of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, which were accepted in 1988 by Morocco and the POLISARIO Front.
The settlement proposals approved by the Council envisaged a transitional period to prepare a referendum in which the people of Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco.
Although this referendum has never been held, MINURSO has continued to carry out its assigned tasks, particularly monitoring the ceasefire and military activities of both sides in the territory, as well as reporting on the general situation in and around Western Sahara.
MINURSO has also supported programs to help Sahrawi families separated by the dividing line reunite with their relatives and to clear landmines in parts of the territory.
Despite its clear limitations regarding its essential mandate, MINURSO remains the only impartial observer deployed throughout the territory—both west and east of the sand wall (berm)—which continues to separate Moroccan and POLISARIO military forces.
Background of the Conflict
Western Sahara, a territory located on the northwest coast of Africa, was administered as a colony by the Kingdom of Spain until 1976.
In the context of decolonization, both Morocco and Mauritania claimed the territory, a claim opposed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO Front), a Sahrawi liberation movement.
When the 1975 Madrid Accords divided the territory between Morocco and Mauritania—transferring Spain’s administrative responsibilities to both countries—armed conflict broke out between the POLISARIO Front, on one side, and Morocco and Mauritania, on the other.
Mauritania renounced its claims to its portion of the territory in 1979, signing an agreement with the POLISARIO Front.
The proclamation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) by the people of Western Sahara, under the leadership of the POLISARIO Front, dates to February 27, 1976—one day after Spain, the former colonial power, withdrew from the territory unilaterally and abruptly without completing the decolonization process, despite its international responsibility to do so under UN supervision.
One of the most significant events of that period was the so-called “Green March” of 1975, a massive mobilization promoted by Morocco to claim Western Sahara by populating it with Moroccan citizens.
This action, inspired by the idea of a “Greater Morocco,” was not internationally recognized and generated tensions with neighboring countries—particularly Algeria, which supported the SADR—and with the POLISARIO Front, which has since fought for the independence of Western Sahara.
Since that time, the ancestral territory of the Sahrawi people (“people of the desert”) has remained divided—part under SADR control, and the other under Moroccan administration—awaiting a self-determination referendum that has been repeatedly promised but never conducted.
This conflict has deeply affected regional politics and diplomatic relations and has highlighted Moroccan nationalist ambitions concerning territories considered by some as inseparable from the kingdom.
It should be noted that an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1975 formally excluded any legal ties between Western Sahara and Morocco, as such a link would undermine the application of Resolution 1514—the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
Creation of MINURSO
The United Nations has sought a solution to the Western Sahara issue since Spain’s withdrawal in 1976. In 1979, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) also began to actively participate in efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
In 1985, the UN Secretary-General, in cooperation with the OAU, initiated a good offices mission that led to the so-called “settlement proposals,” accepted on August 30, 1988, by Morocco and the POLISARIO Front.
In 1990, the Security Council approved the Secretary-General’s report S/21360, which included the full text of the settlement proposals and a plan for their implementation.
On April 29, 1991, through Resolution 690 (1991), the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), in accordance with the Secretary-General’s report S/22464, which detailed the implementation plan.
The referendum in Western Sahara was scheduled for January 1992, but due to deep disagreements between the parties, the original timetable could not be followed, and the referendum never took place.
The MINURSO Identification Commission (IDC) was created in July 1991, and in August 1994, after completing the necessary preparations—including cooperation from the parties—the Mission began identifying potential voters.
In May 1996, the Secretary-General suspended the process, and most of MINURSO’s civilian personnel, including the police component, were withdrawn. In 2004, the IDC formally concluded its work and transferred all documentation to Geneva.
The military component of MINURSO remained on the ground to monitor and verify the ceasefire—a function it continues to fulfill.
Evolution of the Negotiations
After several rounds of consultations conducted by the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoys to reach agreement on the modalities of the referendum, in 2006 the Security Council requested both parties to submit their own proposals for resolving the conflict. In 2007, both sides presented their respective proposals.
Under UN auspices, representatives of both parties, along with representatives from neighboring countries Mauritania and Algeria, held two rounds of talks in June and August 2007.
Although their positions remained divergent, this renewed dialogue marked the first direct encounter between the parties in more than seven years. A third round took place in January 2008, followed by informal meetings in August 2009 and February 2010. None of these meetings produced substantive progress on key issues.
Since MINURSO’s deployment in September 1991, the ceasefire was generally maintained until November 2020, when the POLISARIO Front declared it was resuming armed struggle to achieve its objectives, while continuing its diplomatic and legal efforts.
The most recent report by the UN Secretary-General outlines the situation in the region and MINURSO’s work, noting multiple challenges to be addressed as well as the need to extend the mission’s mandate.
António Guterres expressed deep concern over the situation in Western Sahara and the entrenched circumstances on the ground that hinder progress toward a political solution, emphasizing the protracted and alarming nature of the status quo. He stressed the necessity of maintaining MINURSO as the only impartial source of information and advice for the Security Council and Member States.
He also highlighted that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) continued to receive reports of a shrinking civic space and restrictions on Sahrawis’ rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, amid increased surveillance, harassment, and intimidation.
Moroccan authorities suppressed protests and gatherings in favor of self-determination, with a particularly severe impact on Sahrawi women human rights defenders.
He lamented that the OHCHR has not been granted access to the territory since 2015, despite repeated requests and despite the Security Council’s latest resolution—2756 (2024)—urging strengthened cooperation with OHCHR, including facilitating visits to the region.
Moreover, international observers—including parliamentarians, lawyers, and journalists—continued to face entry restrictions, with dozens being denied access or expelled.
Consequences of Security Council Resolution 2797
The resolution carries deep implications for the geopolitical balance of the Maghreb and beyond.
Morocco emerges strengthened as a central actor and preferred Western partner, while Algeria views this development as a strategic setback that weakens its regional influence and consolidates the Rabat–Washington–Paris–Tel Aviv axis.
International recognition of the autonomy plan offers Morocco a window of opportunity, even in financial and commercial terms.
It should be recalled that only a year earlier, the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that trade and fishing agreements signed with Morocco could not be applied to Western Sahara (including its maritime zone) without the consent of its people.
If the concept of self-determination shifts toward autonomy, the interpretive criteria of such “consent” could be affected.
The consequences of this resolution will likely lead to a deepening of the conflict.
The President of the Republic and Secretary-General of the POLISARIO Front, Brahim Ghali, announced that his organization would not participate in any negotiation that does not respect the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination.
For its part, Algeria formally distanced itself from the Security Council’s resolution, arguing that the adopted text does not faithfully reflect the UN’s decolonization doctrine or the legitimate aspirations of the Sahrawi people—hence its decision not to participate in the vote.
Algeria’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Amar Ben Jamaa, explained that his country abstained from the vote to signal its principled opposition to a resolution that, in his view, favors one party over the other and undermines the Sahrawi right to self-determination.
From the United Nations’ perspective, MINURSO may be entering a different phase—one in which the referendum may no longer be central to its mandate—although these developments remain to be seen. At the same time, human rights monitoring will require greater and more effective attention.
Finally, it cannot be overlooked that this conflict and its latest developments are closely linked to broader geopolitical realignments in Africa, the Arab world, and the planet as a whole. It is enough to note that the resolution in question was proposed by the United States, that China and Russia abstained, and that the Israeli government promptly congratulated Morocco upon its adoption.